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Abstract 
This paper examines how the Admiralty paid prize money to the Royal Navy for the destruction of U-
boats in WW1. The research shows that the method by which it did so was distinct from the standard 
prize process, primarily because of secrecy surrounding the anti-U-boat effort. Prize payments were 
only made by the Admiralty to the crew of naval vessels after the war had ended and this was based 
on reports compiled during wartime.  
The research shows that the payments made closely match the detailed analysis into U-boat losses 
released internally by the Anti-Submarine Division of the Naval Staff in January 1919. This listed 186 
U-boats destroyed. The Admiralty considered 93 of these cases eligible for prize bounty. At least a 
further 41 cases were turned down. 
Where inconsistencies exist between the work of the Anti-Submarine Division and the prizes paid out, 
they are explained by the process of post-war reassessments of U-boats destroyed. The final prize 
payments were made in 1932. 
 
Biographical Note 
Dr Innes McCartney (PhD Bournemouth University 2014) is a nautical archaeologist of the modern 
era, specialising in the relationship between historical texts and the archaeological record. He is 
currently a Leverhulme Research Fellow at Bournemouth University, UK. 
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Introduction: The Archaeological record of U-boat wrecks 1914-1918 and 
the questions it asks of the Historical Text. 
 
The study of the first U-boat war has been undergoing transformation over the last three decades. 
This is because of the high number of both sunken U-boats and their victims which have been 
located and identified during this time, in a process which is continuing to accelerate. The writer’s 
role in this exciting field of study has been based primarily on locating, examining and identifying the 
wrecks of the U-boats and reconciling their remains to the historical record. 
Alongside the writer’s own work are the discoveries made by many others which collectively have 
reached a point where around half of the 178 U-boats lost at sea in WW1 have been found and 
mainly positively identified. Their impact on the historical record has been profound. For example - 
in the English Channel, where nearly every wreck is now accounted for, the 1919 Admiralty tally of 
U-boats destroyed (The 1919 List), (TNA ADM 239/26) bears only a 48% correspondence to where 
the U-boat wrecks have been found and identified in recent years (McCartney, 2014). Such a marked 
difference between the archaeological record and the historical text is worthy of note and further 
archival study to seek to establish why such a disparity exists.  
One case in the English Channel stood out as particularly notable, prompting the research which has 
led to this paper. As described in McCartney (2014 and 2015a), the wreck of the minelayer UC79 was 
found in the Dover minefield off Cap Gris Nez by Admiralty divers in August 1918. But it appears its 
true fate was conveniently ignored, because the Anti-Submarine Division (ASD) of the Naval Staff 
had already decided it was sunk off Zeebrugge in October 1917 and had credited HM Submarine E45 
for doing so. ASD had maintained this assertion despite Room 40 (the Admiralty’s cryptographic 
branch) knowing that from intelligence UC79 was still operational. Indeed the Admiralty maintained 
this fiction even after the wreck was found and then continued to claim HMS E45 sunk UC79 when 
the 1919 List was published in January of that year. 
That ASD would hide the true facts of the loss of UC79 to protect its earlier analysis is a somewhat 
controversial assertion. However it is a view which was seemingly supported by the words of William 
F. Clarke, Intelligence Officer of Room 40 and later Deputy Director of the Naval Section at Bletchley 
Park who wrote in his unpublished autobiographical papers:  
“The Anti-Submarine Division...had frequently to boost their own efforts, insisted on 
the success of many attacks that we in Room 40 knew to have been abortive and many 
officers had received decorations in consequence; when these very gallant men put in 
their claims for prize bounty, it was my none too pleasant task to turn down their 
claims.” (TNA HW 3/16).  
This statement seemed to suggest that perhaps through the detailed analysis of the prize records for 
the destruction of U-boats during WW1 some differences between Room 40’s standpoint on losses 
and that of ASD might emerge. Perhaps austerity curtailed wartime claims about the sinking of 
enemy submarines. Research in this area might even uncover other cases where ASD may have 
insisted on fates Room 40 knew to be impossible. 
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Clarke does not specify exactly when he was involved in assessing prize claims, but the process is 
known to have taken place in the immediate post-war years, up to July 1922. Clarke’s service record 
shows that he was demobilised in 1919 (TNA ADM 337/118). But then according to his papers in 
1920 he was re-employed to work in what became the Government Code and Cipher School 
(GC&CS) where he initially worked on the collation of wartime records and it was during this time, 
alongside many other roles, that he worked on validating prize claims. This seems to fit 
chronologically because in April 1922 GC&CS was handed over to the Foreign Office coinciding with 
the time when prize payments to the Admiralty prize fund for U-boats destroyed ceased (see Figure 
1).  
It should be noted at the outset that the research does not extend to prize payments made to the 
Auxiliary Patrol (usually at the discretion of the local Admiral in Command and which came to fall 
outside of the formal ASD assessment process), the Board of Trade to merchant vessels or payments 
by other national governments. The research was aimed solely at establishing the relationship 
between the 1919 List of U-boats destroyed and payments made through the Admiralty prize fund; 
the amounts of money involved were not analysed. A number of small clerical errors and 
typographic errors were discovered in the records. These were corrected as part of the research and 
are not described. 
The Admiralty Prize Fund and U-boats Destroyed 
During WW1 the Admiralty produced by Order in Council a set of guidelines by which prize monies 
would be paid in accordance with the Naval Prize Act, 1864 (TNA ADM 1/8394/320). Throughout the 
conflict Admiralty prize money was routinely paid for actions which resulted in the capture or 
destruction of enemy ships. The results of these payments can be found in the Admiralty prize 
journal (TNA ADM 238/2).  
The journal shows that when a case was approved for the payment of prize monies, the Admiralty 
paid a set fee into the Admiralty prize fund and it was then distributed in accordance to the currently 
operating guidelines. The guidelines themselves were subject to change during the war in favour of 
the lower deck and were the subject of much internal and public debate, which can be followed in 
the archives (TNA 116/1319C). Evidence for prize payments during the war can be found throughout 
the journal and include such notable cases as HMS Highflyer’s destruction of the armed merchant 
cruiser SS Kaiser Wilhelm der Grosse off North Africa, for which a bounty of £2,580 was paid into the 
fund in July 1916 (TNA ADM 238/2, 11). 
The Admiralty Digest for the early months of WW1 shows that initially prize bounties were 
considered for payment in all cases of U-boats destroyed. For example a payment of £1,000 was 
made to HMT Quickly for sinking U42 on 19 July 1915 (TNA ADM 12/1539A, ADM 239/26). However 
by 1916 things had changed. The Admiralty Digest for 1916 shows that claims for U-boat actions 
were being made but not being resolved until 1919 or later. Of note was a claim by HMS Firedrake 
for the capture of the minelayer UC5, which was later salvaged and used to raise war bonds in the 
UK and USA. Yet this case was not resolved until 1920 (TNA ADM 12/1567A).  
The Digest also reveals why cases were not resolved promptly; in 1916 the Admiralty decided to 
suspend all prize payments for the destruction of U-boats until the end of the war:  
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“Officers concerned to draw up statements of actions so that they are available when required. 
Report not to be made public” (TNA ADM 12/1567A). In effect, the professional Navy’s role in the U-
boat war was being made secret. 
Operations against German submarines evolved over the opening months of the war into one where 
the need to maintain the secrecy of the sources of operational intelligence became paramount. This 
explains why there was a double standard for the payment of awards. Whereas prize payments to 
auxiliaries and merchant ships could be paid in wartime for U-boat actions (with the subsequent 
publicity and boost to morale), those to the Royal Navy could not. This is probably because it was 
only inside the professional Navy that operational intelligence was exploited to hunt U-boats, and 
this had to be kept secret. Examples of cases where operational intelligence was used to destroy U-
boats include instances where Royal Navy submarines were vectored to torpedo U-boats tracked by 
using radio intelligence (McCartney 2014). 
The Digest reveals that the Admiralty was aware that this two standard system created some 
difficulties which had to be resolved after the war. For instance cases where commissioned naval 
officers were serving on merchant ships which successfully sunk U-boats were not paid in wartime 
(TNA ADM 12/1567A). A notable case is mentioned in the Admiralty Digest when the liner SS 
Olympic rammed and sunk U103 on 12 May 1918. In this case the ship was paid prize money but 
“R.N. Officers [were] excluded from award which was given on merchant ship basis” (TNA ADM 
12/1607A).  
By extension therefore, cases where both naval and auxiliary vessels combined to sink a submarine 
had to be treated separately, even though they participated in the same U-boat action. A further 
issue which arose was whether airships were subject to the prize regulations. A note in the 
Admiralty Digest in 1919 states that they were not considered as part of the Auxiliary Patrol and 
therefore not eligible for special payments (TNA ADM 12/1623A) and indeed there is no record of an 
airship receiving prize payments through the Admiralty prize fund. 
Once the Armistice came into effect, the process of validating Admiralty prize claims began; the first 
case, the destruction of UB16 by HMS E34, being paid into the prize fund in March 1919 (TNA ADM 
238/2, 62). The obvious question was upon what evidential basis were prize payments being made? 
In other words, what sources of data would Clarke have used to validate claims? The unequivocal 
answer to this is the ASD 1919 List, the full title of which is, “Losses of Enemy Submarines with 
Summary of Cases, Final Return (Corrected by information received up to 16 January 1919)” (TNA 
ADM 239/26). As shown in Table 1, payments were made to the Admiralty prize fund in 93 cases 
connected to the 1919 List. 
As prize cases were validated, the Admiralty prize fund was credited with the monies to be paid out. 
The last credit made was in July 1922. The Admiralty Digest reveals that in 1927, the claims period 
for making prize applications was reduced to 10 years, meaning in theory no claim would be 
accepted after November 1928 (TNA ADM 12/1703). This was somewhat academic as no payments 
had been made to the Fund for six years previously. Clearly it took time for the fund to identify all 
eligible parties to be paid. The prize journal reveals that the final payment made by the fund was in 
March 1932, when the sum of seven pounds seventeen shillings and seven pence was paid out to an 
eligible party from HMS Campanula for the destruction of UB66 on 18 January 1918 (TNA ADM 
238/2, 388). 
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The Genesis and compilation of the 1919 List  
The year 1916 proved to be a turning point in the fight against the U-boats. In the broadest of terms, 
what had come before had been a threat to Britain; but a threat that could be absorbed; although 
serious it did not constitute a fatal danger to the war effort. However from 31st January 1917 the 
new German strategy of “unrestricted submarine warfare” upon merchant shipping represented 
such a fatal danger to the war effort and indeed the survival of the Allies and the Admiralty had to 
take far greater steps to counter it. A detailed summary of how the Admiralty developed a more 
scientific approach to fighting the U-boats from late 1916 onwards is given in McCartney (2014, 6-
13, 17-21). The rigorous statistical analysis of U-boat destruction an essential formed part of this 
process and a brief summary of its development follows. 
Following Jellicoe’s appointment as First Sea Lord in November 1916, the ASD came into being the 
following month, under the command of Admiral Duff. ASD’s role was to coordinate all the 
Admiralty’s efforts to overcome the U-boat threat. By May 1917, structural reforms within the entire 
Naval Staff brought Room 40 (now called ID25), the Radio Direction-Finding (DF) Section and the 
Convoy and Tracking Sections together into a precursor of the Operational Intelligence Centre of 
WW2 (Beesly 1982, 173-177). Its daily output was available to Duff.  
More importantly its output, published by Naval Intelligence Division (NID) and ASD in the form of 
digests and reports published regularly from mid-1917 formed the foundation of the first truly 
scientific attempt to get to grips with the U-boat menace. Among the myriad publications was the 
“Reported Destruction of Submarines” (the Return), first published in March 1917. This edition 
featured analysis of all U-boat actions where an enemy submarine was considered present and 
recorded since August 1914. Each action was given a graded assessment of the possibility of its 
success from “Known” to “Improbable”. With minor changes, this grading system was still in use by 
the Anti U-boat Division in 1945 (McCartney 2014, 11 & 20).  
In effect what ASD had done was to rework all the ASW reports prior to 1917 into a consistent, 
graded format which it then used for the rest of the war. This was then updated and enhanced each 
quarter with a new edition of the Return. The final edition of the Return in January 1919, signed off 
with the most up to date assessment of all U-boats destroyed during the war and this is what is 
referred to as the 1919 List. 
Importantly, a close examination of each Return shows that the declared fate of some of the U-boats 
was revised as the war progressed. For example as mentioned above HMT Quickly’s destruction of 
U42 in July 1915 is listed as “known” in the March 1917 edition of the list. But by 1919, it is listed as 
“non-existent” because by then ASD realised that the German navy never commissioned a U42 and 
thus  concluded that no U-boat was sunk at the time of Quickly’s action (TNA ADM 239/26). 
Table 1 lists all 186 U-boat fates summarised in the 1919 List. It included the six U-boats interned 
during the war. It also shows the cases against which prize payments were made. Prize payments 
were made in 93 instances, exactly half of the U-boats listed as destroyed. The other 93 cases were 
considered as ineligible because they were sunk by auxiliaries (the preserve of the Auxiliary Patrol 
scheme), by merchant ships (administered by the Board of Trade) or by mines (so indiscriminate as 
to be considered ineligible for prize, except in the cases described below). 
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Claims turned down for an award through the Admiralty Prize Fund. 
Whilst the prize journal only lists the cases where the Admiralty paid into the prize fund, leading us 
to the 93 cases seen in Table 1, the Admiralty Digest also lists cases where the claim for prize 
bounties was turned down. The two lists when read together allow us to ascertain the reasons for 
rejection. 
These cases usually referred to in the Admiralty Digest as “not allowed” appear in three tranches in 
the years, 1918, 1919 and 1920. In all there are 37 such cases where this occurred, together with 
four described later. There may indeed have been more, because the Digest did not always record 
every report passing through the Admiralty each day. Nevertheless there are enough cases to give a 
good indication of the principles governing rejection. Such cases fall into three categories:  
a) There are three cases where ASD showed in earlier editions of the Return that it 
considered a U-boat was “known” yet revised this later in the war;  
b) There are 21 cases where ASD did not ever consider a U-boat was destroyed; 
c) In 13 cases there is no record of the alleged destruction of the U-boat to be found in any 
edition of the ASD Returns. 
The details of the cases mentioned in b) and c) are listed in detail in Appendix 1. It is hoped this may 
be of interest to other researchers, especially of early aviation which account for eight of the 34 
cases relating to air attacks. It is difficult not to be a little suspicious as to the validity of the some of 
the claims in c), which may have been more speculative than genuine, but the cases in a) and b) have 
the ring of truth about them. 
Cases turned down where a U-boat was “destroyed” 
The three cases where a U-boat was at one time considered by ASD to have been destroyed only to 
be later discounted are worthy of further examination; the details are noted below: 
• The claim by H. C. Marshall for the sinking of an enemy submarine on 4 October 1916 while 
aboard HMS E43 was “not approved” (TNA ADM 12/1623A). This incident was originally 
listed “Known (Probably UB Type)” in the March 1917 edition of the Return (TNA ADM 
239/26). But by the time the 1919 List was published this incident is not recorded amongst 
those relating to the sinking of a U-boat. The Anti-Submarine Division (ASD) must have 
finally and correctly concluded that no U-boat was sunk at that time.  
• A similar outcome followed when HMS Ambuscade made a claim for the destruction of a U-
boat on 24 April 1917. The claim was ultimately “not allowed” (TNA ADM 12/1623A) even 
though the incident was originally recorded as “known” in the second quarter 1917 edition 
of the Return (TNA ADM 239/26). Similar to the case above, ASD must have discovered that 
in fact, no U-boat was lost at that time and this incident did not appear in the final 1919 List. 
• The HMS Ambuscade episode also affected a made by the RAF. The claim by Major Hallam 
RAF for the destruction of a German submarine on 24 April 1917. This was also “not 
allowed” (TNA ADM 12/1639) though it had been originally listed as a “known” kill by 
seaplane 8655 in conjunction with HMS Ambuscade. Of note is the fact that his claim was 
one of four Hallam submitted. Whereas all four dates correspond to incidents in the Return, 
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it was only ever in is this case that ASD had originally considered that a U-boat was sunk. The 
other cases were discounted at the time and are dealt with in Appendix 1. 
Cases such as these three clearly demonstrate what Clarke had revealed as attacks ASD had 
accepted yet Room 40 knew to be false. In these cases wartime corrections were eventually made. 
But it must have been something of a surprise to find that no prize was to be awarded. 
In its own technical history (1919, 6), ASD acknowledged that a tension always existed between it 
and the Fleet which considered ASD’s work to be “unduly pessimistic”. Indeed, as Clarke’s states it 
was his “none too pleasant task to turn down their claims”. 
Inconsistencies between the 1919 List and Admiralty Prize Fund Payments  
Table 1 shows that there is a strong similarity between the 1919 List and Admiralty prize payments. 
Of the 93 cases, all but nine correspond. These nine cases are examined in this section. In a further 
tenth case, the Admiralty paid out to the fund with respect to the destruction of an “Unknown” U-
boat by HMS Medea on 25 August 1918. This cannot be reconciled to the Returns, the 1919 List or 
any other archival source examined during the research (TNA 238/2, 124). It remains the only 
Admiralty payment which cannot be readily tied to the wartime assessments made by ASD, and an 
explanation, if there is one, is yet to be identified. 
Paying the prize for losses attributed to mines 
Table 1 shows that in 1919 no less than 38 instances relating to the loss of U-boats were attributed 
to mines or mine nets. It appears that in the immediate post-war period clarity was sought by some 
claimants as to the role vessels may have had in contributing to an enemy submarine diving to 
escape detection, and as a consequence then being destroyed by a minefield or net system into 
which it had submerged. For example the Admiralty Digest for the years 1919 to 1922 reveals an 
ongoing case relating to the destruction of UB53 in the mine nets off Otranto. In this instance the 
Admiralty ultimately was “not satisfied that ships took an active part in its destruction. Claims from 
ships for prize money - officers concerned may take the matter before the Prize Court if they so 
desire”. It is not known if the case was brought, but certainly the ledger records no payment being 
made. In reality, the evidence is sufficient to include this case as a claim turned down (TNA ADM 
12/1671). 
What the Otranto case reveals is that under normal consideration no prize would be expected to be 
paid when a U-boat succumbed to a mine unless ships “took an active part in its destruction”. Table 
1 reveals that prize money was in fact paid out in four cases (marked with a single asterisk), which 
concerned the loss of UC3 in mine nets and U109, UB31 and UC78 to mines, where the vessels 
concerned were credited with an “assist” in the 1919 List.  
In the 1916 case of armed sailing smack Cheero snagging UC3 in her mine nets, a fatal detonation 
followed (TNA ADM 239/26). In the case of U109 the edition of the Return for the first quarter of 
1918 reveals that HM Drifter Beryl III opened fire on the U-boat, forcing it to dive to its destruction in 
the Dover minefield (TNA ADM 239/26, 118). Similarly in the case of UB31 the edition of the Return 
for the second quarter of 1918 reveals that HM Drifter Lord Leitrim and HM Drifter Ocean Roamer 
dropped depth charges on a periscope and consequently contributed to the destruction of a U-boat 
in the Dover minefield. On the same date as the UB31 incident, in the case of UC78 the edition of the 
Return for the second quarter of 1918 reveals that HM Drifters Our Friend, Marys and BTB dropped 
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depth charges in response to a series of mine explosions and consequently presumably hastened the 
demise of the U-boat as a result (TNA ADM 239/26, 141). It is noted that in WW1 many fishing 
vessels such as trawlers and drifters were requisitioned and armed by the Royal Navy for a variety of 
roles including minesweeping and anti-submarine patrolling; and the designation of HM Drifter has 
been used above. 
While all four of these cases show Admiralty payments to the prize fund which are inconsistent with 
the 1919 List this can be attributed to an administrative oversight, as in each case ASD had 
acknowledged in the Returns the active participation of the vessels concerned. If a claim for prize 
money were made, it would have been difficult to refuse. 
In the cases, of the destruction of UB109 off Folkestone and UB116 in Scapa Flow the U-boats were 
detected by personnel monitoring the detector belts and the mines were manually detonated 
ashore when the U-boats were known to be their proximity. The Admiralty Digest for 1920 and 1922 
shows that these cases were refused on the grounds that the personnel involved were “not part of 
the crew of any HM Ships of War” (TNA ADM 12/1633).  
The first U-boat “reassessments” 
Operational intelligence about the movement of U-boats was of course never perfect in wartime. 
Little of the German side was known other than from the interrogations of the few captured U-boat 
officers. It was inevitable that almost as soon as the 1919 List went to print errors would be 
uncovered as new intelligence emerged. The Historical Section of the Admiralty, which is now the 
Naval Historical Branch (NHB) is known to have been making corrections to the 1919 List shortly 
after its publication (McCartney 2014, 10-11).  
In fact, the process of “reassessment” ultimately became a formal duty carried out by NHB. It 
employed a clerk for this purpose into the 1990s. In 1999, when the writer raised with NHB 
inconsistencies with the 1946 List (TNA ADM 199/1789) he was presented with one such formal 
“reassessment” of the loss of U480 (NHB FDSN1/98). This is understood to be one of the last official 
reassessments and that practice is now suspended. 
Table 1 shows five cases marked with a double asterisk. These are instances where the 
inconsistencies to the 1919 List reveal the genesis of the reassessments of U-boat losses in practice 
in the early years of 1919 to 1921.  
The destruction of UC49 
The case of UC49 reveals a path by which corrections to the 1919 List were made in the immediate 
post-war years. In this case the 1919 List stated that UC49 had been sunk on 31 May 1918 in the 
North Sea by a combination of vessels and an aircraft and full details are given in the relevant Return 
(TNA 239/26, 148). The reassessment which followed is the best documented, and the earliest 
example to come to light during research. In the Admiralty Digest for 1919 and 1920 is an entry 
which states that: 
“Claims in respect of German S/M U.C.49 (alleged to have been sunk off Sunderland on 
May 31st 1918) withdrawn as vessel subsequently proved to have been operating 
elsewhere on that date” (TNA ADM 12/1639). 
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The exact reason why the fate of this U-boat was considered different as early as 1919 can be found 
in the Room 40 file for UC49. In a report dated 12 January 1920 it is stated that: 
“This S/M was wrongly allotted to HMS LOCUST &c for an attack on 30 & 31/5/18 in the 
North Sea, but a German Officer informed us that U.C.49 could not have been there and 
we now have telephone diaries showing that she joined Flanders Flotilla and giving her 
movements in and out of Zeebrugge and Ostend up to 1st Aug, when she left. There is 
however, no mention of her return. German list of mines laid by Flanders Flotilla boats 
shows that the one which was to lay mines off Falmouth and Plymouth did not return 
and it is this boat which C in C thinks was sunk by OPOSSUM.  
I.D.25 B.  
12.1.20.” (TNA ADM 137/3918) 
The destruction of UC49 by HMS Opossum on 8 August 1918 off Berry Head, Devon has become the 
accepted fate of this U-boat, being cited in the Official German History (Spindler 1966, 136) and the 
British account of the U-boat War (Gibson & Prendergast 1931, 318). The official British history 
(Newbolt 1931, 338) cites the 1919 List, probably because the files readied in 1919 for the 
publication of the official history were not updated with the newer fate. This case represents an 
additional case of a claim that was turned down after the war.  
The prize journal shows that the Admiralty paid prize money based on the reassessed fate of UC49, 
not the one cited in the 1919 List. In July 1922, in its final tranche of payments, the Admiralty paid 
prize money to the fund to be paid to HMS Opossum (TNA NA 238/2, 209). This instance certainly 
conforms to Clarke’s comment that Room 40 knew this boat was operational after the date cited for 
its loss by ASD (note the reassessment report is signed “ID25”, Room 40’s name from 1917) and is 
perhaps the best documented example in support of what he says. 
Incidentally the Admiralty Digest cites a reference number (X 7067) for this case. Despite thorough 
research with the assistance of William Spencer, Principal Military Specialist at TNA, this record and 
a further 60 others throughout the Digest 1918-1927 pertinent to this paper could not be located in 
the TNA catalogue and are thus presumed lost or destroyed. It was a matter of coincidence that the 
details of this important case came to light in files from earlier research into it. 
The cases of UC7 and UC10 
The 1919 List shows that UC7 was sunk by HMS E54 on 21 August 1916 and that UC10 was sunk by 
the HM Motor Boat Salmon on 6 July 1916. Both cases feature in the first edition of the Return and 
were not subsequently subjected to amendment by ASD (TNA 239/26). However, when prize 
payments were made to the fund, the fates of the two U-boats had been reversed, so that Salmon 
had sunk UC7 and HMS E54 UC10 (TNA ADM 238/2, 119,142). Although this could have been a 
clerical error, the fact that payments were made several months apart required investigation.  
The Room 40 record sheets for both boats were consulted and the only evidence to emerge is that 
the fate of UC10 (to MB Salmon) had been crossed out in pencil at some point (TNA ADM 137/3918). 
By 1931 the fates of both U-boats are shown as being reversed. In Gibson & Prendergast (1931, 104 
& 117) the fates are adjusted and a note states that the fate of UC10 had been “subsequently 
ascertained”. The authors certainly had access to Admiralty files, as seen in the case of UC49 and it is 
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fair to conclude that the loss of both U-boats had also been early post-war reassessments by ID25, 
(possibly by Clarke) and that they occurred some months before the prize payments were made. The 
movements of the Flanders Flotilla U-boats were particularly hard to track, as described below. 
The cases of UC79 and UB54 
Finally are two similar cases. According to the 1919 List on 19 October 1917 HMS E45 sunk UC79 and 
on 11 March 1918 HMS Sturgeon sunk UB54 (TNA 239/26). But notably in July 1919 the Admiralty 
paid prize money to HMS E45 for the incident stated in the 1919 List, but the enemy submarine is 
listed as “Unknown”. In May 1921 HMS Sturgeon was also credited in the same way. 
In the Room 40 history sheet for UC79 is a page of comments clearly showing Room 40 thought it 
was still operational in April 1918 (TNA ADM 137/3918). There is no evidence that an alternative fate 
for UC79 could be found. One could speculate that a compromise was reached whereby HMS E45 
received prize money for a successful attack on an “Unknown” enemy submarine. As described in 
McCartney (2014 & 2015a) the HMS E45’s attack as reported is so implausible that when 
benchmarked against ASD’s own assessment criteria it is somewhat surprising it was allowed to 
stand. 
The Room 40 history sheet for UB54 also has several notes in pencil which could indicate a degree of 
uncertainty as to the fate of this boat. Even in 1931 an alternative fate was being promulgated (TNA 
ADM 137/3916). So as with the former case, prize money was paid because an alternative fate for 
UB54 could be not ascertained at the time prize claims were being assessed and the attack by HMS 
Sturgeon was considered to have resulted in a U-boat destroyed. 
The Flanders Flotilla 
All of the five cases examined above involved U-boats which were operating as part of the Flanders 
Flotilla when they were sunk. This is not too surprising because this unit of the German Navy had 
instituted a strict policy of radio silence of its boats at sea. This rendered extremely difficult any 
attempts by NID at tracking the movements of the boats by direction-finding or cryptographic 
means. The extent to which was the case is analysed in detail in McCartney (2014). It is no surprise 
therefore to see that additional information relating to the movements of UC49 came from a 
surviving German officer and the flotilla telephone directory and not from a re-examination of 
signals intelligence. Where studied, it is found that many of the discrepancies between the 
archaeological record and the 1919 List are due to problems encountered in tracking the Flanders 
Flotilla (McCartney 2014). 
Conclusions 
A detailed comparison between the 1919 List and the Admiralty prize journal reveals a remarkable 
level of consistency between them. In total 134 cases were examined. 93 conform to the 1919 List 
and the others all have valid explanations for being “not allowed”. In only one case (UC49) was the 
refusal of payment in direct conflict with the 1919 List, although others had been subjected to 
adjustment. 
As Table 1 shows, once the cases refused are eliminated, the two sources of data dovetail together 
perfectly. This confirms that when Clarke (and possibly others) validated claims for prize bounty it 
was the ASD output in the form of the Returns and the 1919 list, supported when needed by further 
analysis in the form of ongoing reassessments, which informed the choices made. 
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So where does this leave Clarke’s comments which initially sparked the idea behind this paper? The 
evidence does show that ASD did make claims for U-boats destroyed which it later had to amend 
when faced with additional evidence. These are the cases where Clarke had his “none too pleasant 
task to turn down their claims”. Even though some cases (such as UC79) appear almost wilfully 
erroneous, the evidence from this research suggests that in fact this is the exception, rather than the 
rule. We see in the case of UC79 that it was already subject to revision by the time prize was paid to 
HMS E45. 
It is not really anything more than a matter of speculation as to whether fates were to “boost their 
own efforts”, as Clarke suggests. Thus instead of initially appearing as a criticism of ASD it could be 
argued that Clarke was being sympathetic to the difficulties ASD faced when analysing U-boat losses 
during the war; a subject that he, perhaps more than anyone, had come to truly understand when 
he wrote his comments in the 1950s.  
It is easy to overlook that in 1917 ASD was pioneering a new type of scientific undersea warfare. 
Under the circumstances it is perhaps unfair to be too critical of its work when seen in this historical 
context.  
 
Appendix 1: Cases Turned Down for Prize Payment which were not 
considered “Known” losses. 
Cases listed in the 1919 List which did not result in the destruction of a U-boat. 
Made at the same time as the claim mentioned in the above section, H.C. Marshall also claimed for 
the destruction of a submarine by HMS J2 on 7 July 1917, it was “not approved” (TNA ADM 
12/1623A). The incident was originally listed in the Return as “Probably Sunk” and not subsequently 
adjusted (TNA ADM 239/26). 
Made at the same time as the claim mentioned above, Maj. Hallam RAF also claimed the destruction 
of U-boats on 30 April, 19 May and 3 September 1917. All claims were “not allowed” (TNA ADM 
12/1639). All four dates correspond to air attacks listed in the Return, although it is not confirmed 
that they relate to the ones in the claim. However the fact that all four match recorded events in the 
Returns suggests that it is not mere coincidence. These three cases are as “Possible”, “Improbable” 
and “Probably Seriously Damaged” and were not subsequently adjusted (TNA ADM 239/26). 
Claim by HMS G8 for the sinking of a submarine on 23 July 1917. The claim was “not allowed” as the 
“enemy S/M is not considered to have been destroyed” (TNA ADM 12/1607A). This attack was 
originally graded in the Return as “Probably Sunk” and not subsequently adjusted (TNA ADM 
239/26).  
Claim by HMS Landrail for the sinking of a submarine on 13 Dec 1916 was “not approved” (TNA ADM 
12/1623A). This attack was originally graded in the Return as “Possible” and not subsequently 
adjusted (TNA ADM 239/26). 
Claim by HMS Patriot for the sinking of a submarine on 11 Sep 1916 was “not approved” (TNA ADM 
12/1623A). This attack was originally graded in the Return as “Possible” and not subsequently 
adjusted (TNA ADM 239/26). 
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Claim by HMS Tamarisk (Q11) for the sinking of a submarine on 7 May 1917 was “not approved” 
(TNA ADM 12/1623A). This attack was originally graded in the Return as “Possible” and not 
subsequently adjusted (TNA ADM 239/26). 
Claim by Armed Trawler Urana for the sinking of a submarine on 21 June 1915 was “not approved” 
(TNA ADM 12/1623A). This attack was originally graded in the Return as “Probable” and not 
subsequently adjusted (TNA ADM 239/26). 
Claim by HMS Aubretia (Q13) for the sinking of a submarine on 12 January 1917 was “not approved” 
(TNA ADM 12/1623A). This attack was originally graded in the Return as “Improbable” and not 
subsequently adjusted. A note shows that the Germans reported the U-boat escaped the attack 
(TNA ADM 239/26). 
Claims for the destruction of two submarines by aircraft on 23 April and 12 August 1918 by Capt. 
Boothe and Sgt Day “not approved” (TNA ADM 12/1623A). Only the latter date is mentioned in the 
Return as “Probably Seriously Damaged” (if it is the reported incident) and it was not subsequently 
adjusted (TNA ADM 239/26). 
Claim by HMS Paxton (Q25) for the sinking of a submarine on 30 March 1917 was “not approved” 
(TNA ADM 12/1623A). This attack was originally graded in the Return as “Improbable” and not 
subsequently adjusted (TNA ADM 239/26). 
Claim by HMS E50 for the sinking of a submarine on 29 April 1917 was “not approved” (TNA ADM 
12/1623A). This attack was originally graded in the Return as “Improbable” and not subsequently 
adjusted. A note shows that from German sources the U-boat was known to have survived the 
underwater collision with E50 (TNA ADM 239/26). 
Claim by HMS TB86 for the sinking of a submarine on 6 February 1917 was “not approved” (TNA 
ADM 12/1623A). This attack was originally graded in the Return as “Possible” and not subsequently 
adjusted (TNA ADM 239/26). 
Claims by Maj. Waugh RAF for 3 U-boat kills on 18 October and 11 November 1917 and on 25 June  
1918 were “not allowed” (TNA ADM 12/1623A). Two of the three dates coalesce with air attacks in 
the Return which did not cause losses (TNA ADM 239/26).  
Claim by HMS Tamarisk (Q11) for the destruction of a submarine on 1 December 1916 was “not 
allowed (TNA ADM 12/1639). This attack was originally graded in the Return as “Probable” and not 
subsequently adjusted (TNA ADM 239/26). 
Claim in relation of the late Lieut. Cdr. Shaw in respect of the destruction of an enemy submarine by 
HMS Sylvia in May 1917 was “not allowed” (TNA ADM 12/1639). This is probably related to the 
incident listed in the Return on 20 May 1917 as “Improbable” with a note saying the German press 
reported the safe arrival to base of the submarine (TNA ADM 239/26). 
Other cases not cited in the 1919 List 
Claim by Lieut G.N. Jones DSO RNR of HMS Sprightly for the sinking of a U-boat on 6 April 1917 was 
“not allowed”. No reason is given (TNA ADM 12/1607A). 
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Lieut. E. J. Addis RAF for attacks on enemy submarines on “various dates” was “not approved” (TNA 
ADM 12/1623A). 
Claim for the destruction of a German submarine by aircraft on 20 and 23 April (no year) by Maj. P. 
L. Holmes was “not approved” (TNA ADM 12/1623A). Absence of a year in the dates given means 
this report cannot be accurately attributed. 
Claim for the sinking of a German submarine on 1 February 1915. Report by Col. Samson DSO was 
“not approved” (TNA ADM 12/1623A).  
Enquiry as to result of attack by Flying Boat N4247 on an enemy submarine on 20 May 1918. Also as 
to an attack by Maj. (unreadable), RAF on 20 February 1918. Also as to attack by DH9 B7642 on 9 
May 1918. Claims were “not approved” (TNA ADM 12/1623A). 
Claim by Lieut. Willows RAF for the destruction of a submarine on 14 June 1918 was “not allowed” 
(TNA ADM 12/1623A).  
Claim by HMS Harrier for the sinking of a U-boat on 24 April 1917 was “not approved” (TNA ADM 
12/1623A). 
Claim by Lieut. Cdr. Stone of HMS M18 for sinking a U-boat off the Struma River on 3 August 1916 
was turned down because “Admiralty do not consider that S/M was sunk” (TNA ADM 12/1639). 
Claim by E Lewis of HMS Q20 for the sinking of a U-boat on 12 March 1916 was “not approved as 
there is no record of loss of German S/M at that date” (TNA ADM 12/1639). 
Claim by Lieut. Mayer RAF for sinking a submarine on 18 August 1918 “not approved” (TNA ADM 
12/1639). On this date the minelayer UC70 was sunk by a combination of Aeroplane BK9983 and 
HMS Ouse (TNA ADM 239/26). The fact that this claim was not approved means that the claimant 
was most likely referring to another incident, was not sufficiently engaged to warrant payment or 
had payment denied for disciplinary reasons. In August 1920 the Admiralty paid out on the 
destruction of UC70 to both plane and aircraft (TNA ADM 238/2). Clearly Mayer was not a recipient 
of a prize payment. 
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Figures: 
 
Figure 1. Paymaster Lieutenant-Commander William F. Clarke RNVR. Intelligence Officer in Room 40 
from 1916. Re-employed post war into the GC&CS, he was the co-author of the Admiralty’s 
unpublished three-volume history of the German Navy. During this time he also validated prize 
claims for U-boats destroyed (Churchill Archives Centre). 
Tables: 
 
Table 1: Table of U-boats listed destroyed as per the 1919 List and those upon which a prize 
payment was made. 
  Boat   1919 List Fate     Where   Date Prize Date 
U5 Mine Zeebrugge Dec-14 N/A  
U6 HMS E16 5910n 0509e 15/09/1915 Yes Aug-19 
U7 Torpedoed by U-boat North Sea Jan-15 N/A  
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U8 HMS Gurkha 5056n 0509e 04/03/1915 Yes Feb-20 
U10 Mine 5126n 0250e May-16 N/A  
U11 Mine Zeebrugge Dec-14 N/A  
U12 HMS Ariel Firth of Forth 10/03/1915 Yes Feb-20 
U13 Mine Heliogland 12/09/1914 N/A  
U14 HMS Hawk Peterhead 05/06/1915 Yes Nov-20 
U15 HMS Birmingham 5835n 0156e 09/08/1914 Yes Aug-19 
U18 HM Dorothy Gray 5841n 0255w 23/11/1914 Yes Jul-21 
U20 Stranded Jutland 04/11/1916 N/A  
U23 HMS C27 Fair Island 20/07/1915 Yes Jan-21 
U26 Unknown Baltic Aug-15 N/A  
U27 HMS Baralong 5043n 0722w 19/08/1915 Yes Feb-20 
U28 Accident 7234n 2756e 02/09/1917 N/A  
U29 HMS Dreadnought Moray Firth 18/03/1915 Yes Aug-20 
U31 Unknown Unknown Jan-15 N/A  
U32 HMS Wallflower 3607n 1328e 08/05/1918 Yes Feb-20 
U34 HMS Privet 3556n 0525w 09/11/1918 Yes Mar-21 
U36 HMS Prince Charles 5907n 0530w 24/07/1915 Yes Jul-20 
U37 Unknown North Sea Jun-15 N/A  
U39 Interned Cartagena 18/05/1918 N/A  
U40 HMS C24 Aberdeen 23/06/1915 Yes Oct-20 
U41 HMS Baralong 4910n 0723w 24/09/1915 Yes Feb-20 
U44 HMS Oracle 5851n 0420e 12/08/1917 Yes Feb-20 
U45 HMS D7 5548n 0730w 12/09/1917 Yes Feb-20 
U48 Dover HMDs 5117n 0131e 24/11/1917 Yes Mar-20 
U49 SS British Transport 4617n 1442w 11/09/1917 N/A  
U50 HS Operations North Sea 1-11 Oct 1917 N/A  
U51 HMS H5 5355n 0753e 14/07/1916 Yes Sep-19 
U56 Russian Patrol Vessels 7020n 3100e 02/11/1916 N/A  
U58 USS Fanning 5137n 0812w 17/11/1917 N/A  
U59 Mine Heligoland 14/05/1917 N/A  
U61 HMS P51 5148n 0552w 26/03/1918 Yes Jun-21 
U64 HMS Lychnis 3807n 1027e 17/06/1918 Yes Apr-21 
U66 HS Operations North Sea 1-11 Oct 1917 N/A  
U68 HMS Farnborough 5154n 1053w 22/03/1916 Yes Feb-20 
U69 HMS Patriot 6023n 0132e 12/07/1917 Yes Nov-19 
U74 HMT Searanger 5710n 0120e 27/05/1916 Yes Mar-21 
U75 Mine 5359n 0524e 10/12/1917 N/A  
U76 Russian armed trawlers Hammerfest 26/01/1917 N/A  
U77 Unknown North Sea 07/07/1916 N/A  
U78 HMS G2 5602n 0508e 28/10/1918 Yes Aug-19 
U81 HMS E54 5100n 1300w 01/05/1917 Yes May-20 
U83 HMS Q5 5134n 1123w 17/02/1917 Yes Feb-20 
U84 HMS P62 5153n 0544w 26/01/1918 Yes Jan-21 
U85 HMS Q19 4952n 0320w 12/03/1917 Yes Aug-21 
U87 HMS P56 5256n 0507w 25/12/1917 Yes May-21 
U88 HMS Stonecrop 4942n 1318w 17/09/1917 Yes Dec-21 
U89 HMS Roxburgh 5538n 0732w 13/02/1918 Yes Sep-19 
U92 Mine Northern Barrage (Area B) 09/09/1918 N/A  
U93 SS Braeneil 4935n 0512w 07/01/1918 N/A  
U95 Unknown Unknown Jan-18 N/A  
U99 SS Valeria 5220n 1228w 20/06/1917 N/A  
U102 Mine Prob. Northern Barrage (Area B) Sep-18 N/A  
U103 SS Olympic 4916n 0451w 12/05/1918 N/A  
U104 HMS Jessamine 5159n 0626w 25/04/1918 Yes Aug-19 
U106 HS Operations North Sea 5-9 Oct 1917 N/A  
U109 Mine * 5053n 0131e 26/01/1918 N/A Aug-20 
U110 HMS Michael 5549n 0806w 15/03/1918 Yes May-20 
U154 HMS E35 3645n 1200w 11/05/1918 Yes May-20 
U156 Mine Northern Barrage (Area A) 25/09/1918 N/A  
UB1 Unknown Mediterranean Aug-15 N/A  
UB3 Gleaner of Sea 5131n 0250e 24/04/1916 Yes Jul-21 
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UB4 HM Decoy G and E 5239n 0217e 11/08/1915 Yes Mar-23 
UB6 Interned Maas 13/03/1917 N/A  
UB7 Unknown Black Sea Oct-16 N/A  
UB12 Mine South North Sea Aug-18 N/A  
UB13 Unknown Unknown Mar-16 N/A  
UB15 Unknown Mediterranean May-16 N/A  
UB16 HMS E34 5206n 0201e 10/05/1918 Yes Mar-19 
UB17 HMS Onslow 5000n 0225w 25/02/1918 Yes Jun-22 
UB18 Mine 5008n 0342w 17/11/1917 N/A  
UB19 HMS Q7 4956n 0245w 30/11/1916 Yes Sep-19 
UB20 SP 8676, 8662 5207n 0227e 29/07/1917 Yes Mar-20 
UB22 Mine North Sea 19/01/1918 N/A  
UB23 Interned Corunna 29/07/1917 N/A  
UB26 Drifter & French TB Le Havre 05/04/1916 N/A  
UB27 HMS Halcyon 5247n 0224e 29/07/1917 Yes Jan-21 
UB29 HMS Ariel 4941n 0630w 06/12/1916 Yes Aug-19 
UB30 John Gillman 5432n 0035w 13/08/1918 N/A  
UB31 Mine * 5101n 0116e 02/05/1918 N/A Jun-21 
UB32 SP 9860 4958n 0138w 18/08/1917 Yes Aug-19 
UB33 Mine 5056n 0117e 11/04/1918 N/A  
UB35 HMS Leven 5103n 0146e 26/01/1918 Yes Dec-19 
UB36 Unknown Unknown Jun-17 N/A  
UB37 HMS Q7 5007n 0147w 14/01/1917 Yes Sep-19 
UB38 Mine 5056n 0125e 08/02/1918 N/A  
UB39 HMS Glen 5005n 0125w 17/05/1917 Yes Jul-21 
UB41 Explosion Scarborough 05/10/1917 N/A  
UB44 HMD Quarry Knowe 4012n 1846e 30/07/1916 Yes May-21 
UB45 Accident Black Sea 30/10/1916 N/A  
UB46 Mine Dardanelles 16/12/1916 N/A  
UB52 HMS H4 4146n 1835e 23/05/1918 Yes Sep-19 
UB53 Mine nets 3958n 1901e 03/08/1918 N/A  
UB54 HMS Sturgeon etc. ** 5307n 0243e 11/03/1918 Yes May-21 
UB55 Mine 5101n 0120e 22/04/1918 N/A  
UB56 Mine 5058n 0121e  19/12/1917 N/A  
UB57 Mine Zeebrugge 14/08/1918 N/A  
UB58 Mine 5058n 0114e 10/03/1918 N/A  
UB61 Mine 5325n 0458e 29/11/1917 N/A  
UB63 HMTs WS Bailey & Fort George 5617n 0225w 28/01/1918 Yes Jul-21 
UB65 Accident 5107n 0942w 10/07/1918 N/A  
UB66 HMS Campanula 3535n 1439e 18/01/1918 Yes Mar-23 
UB68 HMS Snapdragon 3556n 1620e 04/10/1918 Yes Sep-19 
UB69 HMS Cyclamen 3730n 1038e 08/01/1918 Yes May-20 
UB70 HMS Basilisk & Lydonia 3808n 0302e 08/05/1918 Yes Oct-20 
UB71 ML413 3558n 0518w 21/04/1918 Yes May-21 
UB72 HMS D4 5008n 0241w 12/05/1918 Yes May-20 
UB74 HMY Lorna 5032n 0232w 26/05/1918 Yes Oct-20 
UB75 Mine nets Flamborough Head 10/12/1917 N/A  
UB78 SS Queen Alexandria 4950n 0140w 09/05/1918 N/A  
UB81 Mine 5027n 0053w 02/12/1917 N/A  
UB82 HMDs Pilot Me & Young Fred 5513n 0515w 17/04/1918 Yes Dec-21 
UB83 HMS Ophelia 5828n 0150w 10/09/1918 Yes Feb-20 
UB85 HMD Coreopsis 5447n 0527w 30/04/1918 Yes Aug-21 
UB90 HMS L12 5757n 1027e 16/10/1918 Yes Aug-19 
UB103 Mine 5052n 0127e 16/09/1918 N/A  
UB104 Mine Northern Barrage (Area B) 19/09/1918 N/A  
UB107 HMT Calvia etc. 5424n 0024w 27/07/1918 Yes May-21 
UB108 Unknown Unknown Jul-18 N/A  
UB109 Mine 5108n 0114e  29/08/1918 N/A  
UB110 ML263 and Garry 5439n 0054w 19/07/1918 Yes Aug-19 
UB113 Unknown Probably North Sea Sep-18 N/A  
UB115 HMS Ouse & Star etc. 5512n 0122w 29/09/1918 Yes May-20 
UB116 Mine 5850n 0304w 28/10/1918 N/A  
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UB119 Unknown Unknown May-18 N/A  
UB123 Mine Northern Barrage (Area A) 19/10/1918 N/A  
UB124 HMS Marne 5543n 0751w 20/07/1918 Yes Apr-21 
UB127 Mine Prob. Northern Barrage (Area B) Sep-18 N/A  
UC1 SP 8689 5200n 0236e 24/07/1917 Yes Apr-21 
UC2 SS Cottingham Yarmouth 02/07/1915 N/A  
UC3 Mine nets * 5242n 0224e 23/04/1916 N/A Mar-23 
UC5 Stranded Shipwash 27/04/1916 N/A Feb-20 
UC6 SP 8676 5137n 0251e 28/09/1917 Yes May-20 
UC7 HMS E54 ** 5145n 0320e 21/08/1916 Yes Feb-21 
UC8 Interned Terschelling 04/11/1915 N/A  
UC9 Own Mines South North Sea Oct-15 N/A  
UC10 MB Salmon ** 5215n 0154e 06/07/1916 Yes May-20 
UC11 Mine 5155n 0141e 26/06/1918 N/A  
UC12 Own Mines Taranto 17/03/1916 N/A  
UC13 Unknown Mediterranean Nov-16 N/A  
UC14 Mine Zeebrugge Oct-17 N/A  
UC15 Unknown Black Sea Nov-16 N/A  
UC16 HMS Melampus 5024n 0030w 23/10/1917 Yes Aug-19 
UC18 HMS Medea 5438n 0055w 12/03/1917 Yes Jul-20 
UC19 HMS Llewellyn 5108n 0140e 04/12/1916 Yes Nov-19 
UC21 Mine nets 5130n 0134e 27/09/1917 N/A  
UC24 French S/M Circe Cattaro 24/05/1917 N/A  
UC26 HMS Milne 5103n 0140e 09/05/1917 Yes Aug-19 
UC29 HMS Pargust 5147n 1140w 07/06/1917 Yes Feb-20 
UC30 Mine North Sea 19/04/1917 N/A  
UC32 Own Mines Sunderland 23/02/1917 N/A  
UC33 HMS P61 5155n 0614w 26/09/1917 Yes May-22 
UC35 Fr Patrol Vessel Ailly 3948n 0742e 16/05/1918 N/A  
UC36 SP 8663 5212n 0300e 20/05/1917 Yes Aug-19 
UC38 French DDs 3832n 2034e 14/12/1917 N/A  
UC39 HMS Thrasher 5403n 0002e 08/02/1917 Yes Jul-20 
UC41 HMT Jacinth Tay 21/08/1917 Yes May-21 
UC42 Own Mines 5141n 0814w 10/09/1917 N/A  
UC43 HMS G13 6057n 0111w 10/03/1917 Yes Aug-19 
UC44 Own Mines Waterford 04/08/1917 N/A Aug-19 
UC46 HMS Liberty 5107n 0139e 08/02/1917 Yes Nov-19 
UC47 HMS P57 5401n 0022e 18/11/1917 Yes Sep-19 
UC48 Interned Ferrol 23/03/1918 N/A  
UC49 HMS Locust etc. ** 5448n 0106w 31/05/1918 Yes Jul-22 
UC50 HMS Zubian 5047n 0059e 04/02/1918 Yes Nov-19 
UC51 HMS Firedrake 5210n 0230e 13/11/1917 Yes Jul-19 
UC55 HMS Sylvia & Tirade 6008n 0100w 29/09/1917 Yes Mar-20 
UC56 Interned Santander 24/05/1918 N/A  
UC57 Unknown Baltic 19-22 Nov 1917 N/A  
UC61 Stranded Gris Nez 26/07/1917 N/A  
UC62 Unknown North Sea Oct-17 N/A  
UC63 HMS E52 5123n 0200e 01/11/1917 Yes Jul-19 
UC64 Mine 5058n 0123e 20/06/1918 N/A  
UC65 HMS C15 5028n 0017e 03/11/1917 Yes May-20 
UC66 HMT Sea King 4956n 0510w 12/06/1917 Yes Mar-21 
UC68 HMS C7 5142n 0317e 05/04/1917 Yes Aug-19 
UC69 Collision U96 Barfleur 06/12/1917 N/A  
UC70 BK 9983 & HMS Ouse 5431n 0040w 28/08/1918 Yes Aug-20 
UC72 SP 8695 5145n 0205e 22/09/1917 Yes Dec-19 
UC75 HMS Fairy 5357n 0009e 31/05/1918 Yes Feb-20 
UC77 Kessingland & Golden Gain 5101n 0119e 10/07/1918 N/A  
UC78 Mine * 5056n 0123e 02/05/1918 N/A Apr-21 
UC79 HMS E45 ** 5216n 0246e 19/10/1917 Yes Jul-19 
 
An additional payment was made to HMS Medea for the destruction of an “Unknown” on 28 Aug 1918. This cannot be reconciled to the 
1919 List. 
20 
 
 
*Cases where prize was paid related to incidents ascribed to mines in the 1919 List. 
** Cases which do not conform to the 1919 List. 
